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THE CASE OF THE APPAM'
On February Ist a German prize crew brought the British
steamer Appam into Newport News and asked for her intern-
ment. The British government at once put in a claim for the
restoration of the vessel on the ground that the ship could not
be granted an asylum in an American port without a violation
of neutrality. The British owners of the ship likewise brought
suit in the Federal District Court to recover possession of the
ship and cargo. The German government protested to the De-
partment of State against the institution of judicial proceedings
against the ship. The Appam, it was contended, was a legiti-
mate prize and as such was entitled to enter and to remain as long
as she pleased in anAmerican port. The Secretary of State, how-
ever, took the position that the Appam did not fall within the
express provisions of the Prussian treaty and that she was entitled
to those privileges only which were generally granted to prizes,
"namely, to enter neutral ports only in case of stress of weather,
want of fuel and provisions or necessity of repairs, but to leave
as soon as the cause of their entry has been removed." Mr.
Lansing accordingly declined to interfere with the proceedings
before the court. The question of the court's jurisdiction, he
maintained, "was one for judicial ascertainment and not for
executive determination." Meanwhile the District Court pro-
ceeded with the hearing of the case.
1. (1916) 234 Fed. Rep. p. 389.
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The judgment of Judge Waddill is a sweeping refutation of
the whole German contention:
The court's conclusion is that the manner bf bringing the
Appam into the waters of the United States, as well as her
presence in those waters, constitutes a violation of the neu-
trality of the United States; that she came in without bidding
or permission; that she is here in violation of law; that she
is unable to leave for lack of a crew, which she cannot provide
or augment without further violation of neutrality; that in
her present condition, she is without lawful right to be and
remain in these waters; that she, as between her captors and
owners, to all practical intents and purposes, must be treated
as abandoned and stranded upon our shores; and that her
owners are entitled to restitution of their property, which this
court should award, irrespective of the prize court proceed-
ings of the court of the imperial government of the German
Empire; and it will be so ordered.
The case raises a number of most interesting questions in
international law: "(I) As to right of entrance and asylum for
German prizes in American ports under the Prussian treaties.
By Art. 19 of the treaty of 1799,2 renewed in part by Art. 12 of
the treaty of 1828, it was provided that "the vessels of war, pub-
lic and private of both parties, shall carry freely wheresoever
they please, the vessels and effects taken from their enemies * * *
nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched or put under legal
process when they come to and enter the ports of the other party,
but may freely be carried out-again at any time by their captors
to the places expressed in their commissions." In construing this
article, the Court follows closely the views of the Secretary of
State in laying down that in the light of contemporary interpreta-
tion of similar clauses in other treaties, "prizes cannot be brought
into the waters of the United States for the purpose of laying
up by a prize master but can only be brought in by the capturing
vessel herself, or a war vessel acting as convoy to such prize
and then not for an indefinite period, but for the temporary
,muses recognized by international law."
But in restricting the enjoyment of the hospitality of the port
to prizes under escort only, the Court, it is submitted, is observing
the letter rather than the spirit of the treaty.4  During the wars
of the i8th century it was the recognized custom for warships to
place prize crews on board captured vessels and send them into
2. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc. vol. 2, p. 1492.
3. Moore, Digest of Int. Law. vol. 7, p. 935-6.
4. 16 Columbia Law Rev. Nov. 1916, p. 587.
THE CASE OF THE APPAM
neutral ports for sequestration. From the standpoint of the
principles of neutrality it did not make a particle of difference
whether the prize came in under convoy of the captor or in
charge of a prize crew. The Prussian treaty, it is reasonable to
assume, was made with a view to preserve this well understood
right and should be interpreted in accordance with the interna-
tional practice of that day. And such in fact has been the
c6nstruction which the United States courts have placed upon
the corresponding article of the treaty of Amity and Commerce
with France in 1778.5 In Salderondo v. The Nostra Signora del
Carinino,6 the captured ship was brought in by a prize crew and
yet the Court ruled that the I7th article of the treaty was con-
clusive in excluding the jurisdiction of the Court. The decision
in Reid v. The Vere7 was to a similar effect. In neither of these
cases was it even suggested that the presence of the capturing
ship was essential to the enjoyment of the right of sequestration.
The Court assumed without question that the protection of the
treaty was intended to operate as much to the advantage of th(
prize crew as to the original captor.
The Court is on somewhat stronger ground, it would seem,
in maintaining that the treaty does not grant the right to a per-
manent asylum in American ports. The restricted interpreta-
tion of the Court on this point is not only warranted by the ex-
press language of the treaty itself, but is also supported by the
opinion of President Jefferson and of other public officials., It
is interesting to observe, moreover, that in the two above cited
cases, the captors expressly pleaded that the prizes were only
temporarily in the waters of the United States in the course of
their voyage to the home port for adjudication. There is, in
fact, an essential difference in principle between a temporary
sojourn and a permanent deposit of a prize in a neutral port.
For the neutral to grant the former is a mere act of courtesy
such as is extended to all public ships. But to permit the latter
is essentially an unneutral act; it is equivalent in effect to a use
of the territory as a base of hostile operations since it not only
preserves the prize from the danger of recapture, but it relieves
the belligerent of the burden of taking the prize to a home port
for adjudication. 9
5. Ibid.
6. (1794) Bee 43, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12,247.
7. (1795) Bee 66, 20 Fed. Cas. No. 11,670.
8. Moore, Digest of Int. Law. vol. 7, p. 935-6.
9. "There is high authority for the position that a prize may be carried
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But apart from the treaty, the further question arises: What
are the rights of the Appam under general international law?
Has she a right to enter and find a refuge in the waters of the
United States? Upon this point the Court declares:
The generally accepted doctrine now is that enlightened
nations do not allow the use of their ports as asylum or per-
manent rendezvous of prizes of other nations captured dur-
ing war. To do so would tend to involve the neutral powers
in conflict with nations with whom they are at peace; and to
extend the use of their ports to all belligerents alike, would
not relieve the objection, as the opposing vessels so using them
might quickly cause conflict in neutral territory. The policy
of the United States has been, and is, consistently opposed to
such use of their waters and harbors; and the history and
origin of their neutrality laws, and the circumstances of
their passage, clearly indicate a purpose to prohibit the use
of their ports for the laying up of belligerent prizes.
In support of this position, the Court appeals to the provisions
of the Hague Convention of 1907i° in regard to prizes and to
the frequent declarations of American officials and international
jurists, as affording conclusive evidence of the non-existence of
a right of asylum according to international law.
But the judgment of the Court, it is again submitted, is open
to serious question both from the standpoint of law and practice.
The provisions of the Hague Convention on this point have no
direct application to the case."x  By Art. 28 it is expressly pro-
vided that the convention shall not apply except as between con-
into a neutral port and there sold, but considerations of expediency should
lead the neutral sovereign to exercise his undoubted right of prohibiting
such sale. It would be a breach of neutrality to permit a port to be
made a cruising station for a belligerent or a depot for his spoils and
prisoners." Wirt, Att. Gen. 1828, 2 Att. Gen. Op. 86. Moore, Digest of
Int. Law, vol. 7, p. 936.
10. Art. 21. A prize may only be brought into a neutral port on account
of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or provisions.
It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified its entry are
at an end. If it does not the neutral power must order it to leave at once.
Should it fail to obey the neutral power must employ the means at its
disposal to release it with its officers and crew and to intern the prize crew.
Art. 22. A neutral power must similarly release a prize brought into one
of its ports under circumstances other than those referred to in Art. 21.
Art. 23. A neutral power may allow prizes to enter its ports and road-
steads whether under convoy or not when they are brought there to be
sequestered pending the decision of a prize court. It may have the prize
taken to another of its ports. If the prize is convoyed by a war ship, the
prize crew may go on board the convoying ship. If the prize is not
under convoy, the prize crew are left at liberty.
11. The Senate rejected Art. 23 on the recommendation of the American
delegation to the Hague.
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tracting parties and then only if all belligerents are parties to the
convention.' The Senate of the United States ratified Arts. 21
and 22 of the convention but as England was not a party to the
convention, it is manifest that she has no legal claim against the
United States, save in so far as the Convention may be declara-
tory of the general principles of international law.
What, then, is the general rule of law in respect to the ex-
clusion of prizes. Upon this point it may be said that the prac-
tice of nations has varied. During the Napoleonic wars, the
British navy frequently carried its prizes into neutral ports and
the legality of such acts was clearly recognized. 12 The practice
was continued during the Crimean war though subject to stricter
limitations in favor of all neutral states. 3 The British naval
regulations of 1888 also provide that prizes may be carried into
neutral ports subject to the consent of the neutral nation.1 4 The
more recent policy of the English government, however, has been
to deny a right of asylum in neutral territory. This policy has
been followed during the Franco-Prussian, Spanish-American,
and Russo-Japanese wars.'"!
The practice of the -United States has been far from con-
sistent. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the
United States government permitted prizes to be brought into
American ports and sold even prior to condemnation.' 6 This
permission, however, was looked upon as a favor, not as a right,
save in the case of express treaty obligations.' 7 In later years,
however, there has been a marked tendency to follow the example
of England in the matter of exclusion, but it is only in exceptional
cases that the government has absolutely refused the privilege of
entrance.' 8 The majority of American jurists have 'recognized
the legality of the practice of admitting prizes though they have
generally deplored its continuance.'? The United States courts
12. The Flad Oyen, (1799) 1 C. Rob. 135. The Henrick and Maria,(1799) 4 C. Rob. 43. The Peacock, (1802) 4 C. Rob. 185.
13. The Polka, (1854) Spinks Prize Rep. 447.
14. Manual of Naval Prize Law. p. 85.
15. Naval War College, Int. Law Situations, 1905, p. 68.
16. Consul of Spain v. Consul of Great Britain, (1808) Bee 263, 6 Fed.
Cas. No. 3138.
17. Moore, Digest of Int. Law, vol. 7, p. 936. 16 Columbia Law Rev. Nov.
1916. p. 587.
18. Naval War College, Int. Law Situations, 1908, p. 75. Moore, Digest
of Int. Law, vol. 7, p. 938.
19. Naval War College, Int. Law Situations, 1908, p. 63.
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have laid down the same general principle of the qualified right
of admission.
20
The general neutral practice, says Dana, has been tending to-
ward refusing the privilege of entrance of prizes except in cases
of necessity.21 The practice of nations in the Spanish-American
and Russo-Japanese wars tends to confirm Mr. Dana's conclu-
sions. The declarations of neutrality in these wars are practi-
cally unanimous in forbidding the entrance of prizes into neutral
ports except in cases of stress of weather or lack of provisions. 22
Brazil, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Holland,
Portugal, China, and Sweden all issued proclamations to this
effect. Similar proclamations were issued by most of the neutral
nations at the outbreak bf the present war. But the United States
is the great outstanding exception to the rule. In its proclama-
tion of neutrality no mention whatever is made of the question
'of prizes.23 The Executive of the United States evidently did not
consider its ratification of the Hague Convention as furnishing
the measure of its legal responsibility in th matter of prizes.
In view of these historical precedents, it seems safe to con-
clude that the views of the District Court are considerably in
advance of the generally accepted principles of international law.
The doctrine laid down by the Court is undoubtedly gaining in
favor, but it has not yet received the confirmation of all mem-
bers of the family of nations.2 4  In the absence of a general
declaration of the United States to the contrary, it would seem
that the German captors were entitled to assume that they had the
right to bring in their prize for sequestration.2 5
Closely associated with the question "of the admission of prizes
20. Jecker v. Montgomery, (1851) 13 Howard, 498.
21. Naval War College, Int. Law Situations, 1908, p. 67.
22. Ibid. p. 70.
23. Supplement to the Amer. Jour. Int. Law, vol. 9, p. 110.
24. The question of the admission of prizes, is at present essentially a
political issue. It is a question of the conflicting interests of England
and of certain of the larger continental states. Thanks to her vast
imperial domain, England is able to find convenient ports into which to
bring her prizes. She has a great naval advantage of which she is
anxious to make full use. But the other nations are not so favorably
situated; they are forced to look to'neutral ports as a temporary refuge
for their prizes. Under these circumstances it is exceedingly difficult to
reach any general agreement upon the question. From the standpoint
of international law, the exclusion of prizes would undoubtedly be a great
gain, but from the standpoint of naval expediency, it would appear to be
a dangerous principle for the United States government to adopt.
25. The right of asylum, Attorney General Cushing declared, "is pre-
sumed where it has not been previously denied." Cushing, Atty. Gen.
1855, 7 Att. Gen. Op. 122.
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is the further question of the right of a belligerent court to pass
judgment upon a vessel within the jurisdiction of a neutral coun-
try. In opposition to the German contention that title to the
prize was acquired by right of capture, the Court laid down that
the title did not pass until a decision had been reached by the
courts of the captor condemning the vessel as lawful prize and
that such decision could not legally take place in the captor's
country while the prize was lying in a foreign port. But how-
ever advantageous the principle here asserted may be in theory,
the decision of the Court, it may safely be asserted, has gone very
much further than any previous adjudications of the courts. The
general attitude of the American as also of the English courts26
has been strongly opposed to the exercise of jurisdiction over
war prizes in foreign ports. Nevertheless, they have clearly
recognized the validity of such jurisdiction on more than one
occasion. In the case of Jecker v. Montgomery,27 -the Court held
that although it was the duty of the American captor to bring
his prize to a home port for adjudication, there might neverthe-
less be valid reasons for carrying it into neutral waters. And in
Arabella v. Madeira,2 s Justice Story declared that according to
both English and American precedents, the courts of a belligerent
country could render judgment concerning a captured ship lying
in a neutral port. The legality of the practice has likewise been
affirmed by leading authors on international law, though many
of them deprecate the practiceY. ° In view of these decisions, it
is difficult to accept the opinion of the court in respect to the in-
validity of the proceedings before the German prize court upon
the Appam. The decisions of a prize court would undoubtedly
take on a much higher and more authoritative character if the
judgment of Judge Waddill should prevail, but meantime it must
be confessed that the United States courts alone can scarcely lay
down a principle which will bind foreign governments and courts
in opposition to the general practice of nations.The final question arises as to the jurisdiction of the United
States courts over the prize. As the entrance of the Appam into
a United States port to escape capture constituted in the opinion
of the court, a violation of neutrality, there could be no doubt
26. The Henrick and Maria, (1799) 4 C. Rob. 43.
27. (1851) 13 Howard, 498.
28. 2 Gallison, 368, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 501.
See also The Invincible, (1814) 2 Gallison, 29, 39. Hudson v. Guestier,(1808) 4 Cranch, 293.
29. Naval War College, Int. Law Situations, 1908, p. 62.
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as to the right of a United States court to vindicate the neutrality
of the country by entertaining an action for the restoration of
the ship to the original owners. The opinion of the court upon
this point is based on various alleged precedents, none of which
seem to be particularly in point with the exception of the case
of Queen v. The Chesapeake.30  In this case a British colonial
prize court laid down that "for a belligerent to bring an uncon-
demned prize into a neutral port to avoid recapture is an offense
so grave against a neutral state that it ipso facto subjects that
prize to forfeiture."
The judgment of the Court in that case goes inuch further
than any decision of an American court. In the case of Hopner
v., Appleby,31 the Court held that the courts of a neutral nation
have no right to decide upon the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a
capture made by one belligerent from another except in the case
of a violation of neutrality by capture of the prize in its terri-
torial waters or by fitting out of the capturing ship in one of its
ports. And there are many other decisions to a similar effect.
32
The United States courts have hitherto never gone so far as to
assert that the mere entrance of a prize into an American port
would violate the neutrality of the United States and, hence af-
ford just ground for the exercise of jurisdiction on the part of
the American courts. The Appain, as Mr. James Brown Scott
has pointed out,33 did not come in as a trespasser but in assertion
of a right under the Prussian-American treaty. So long as the
Department of State had not ruled to the contrary, the prize mas-
ter was justified in believing that he enjoyed the right of entrance
and sequestration. The Department of State, moreover, not only
permitted the Appam to enter without question, but distinctly
informed the British ambassador that her entrance did not con-
stitute a violation of American neutrality. In view of these cir-
cumstances, it is difficult to see how the mere fact of entrance
could give rise to an assertion of jurisdiction on the part of a
United States court.34  A continued sojourn after official notice
to depart would doubtless constitute a violation of neutrality
30. (1864) 5 Nova Scotia Reports, 797.
31. (1828) 5 Mason, 71, 75.
32. The Mary Ford, (1798) 3 Dallas, 188, 198. The Josefa Segunda, 5
Wheaton, (1820) 338, 357. Hudson v. Guestier, (1808) 4 Cranch, 293.
33. Scott, The Case of the Appam. 10 Amer. Jour. Int. Law, 809.
34. In Hudson v. Guestier the Supreme Court declared that "a vessel
captured as prize of war is then while lying in the port of a neutral still in
the possession of the sovereign of the captor and that possession cannot
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sufficient to warrant the intervention of the courts, but the occa-
sion for such action has not yet arisen 5
In short, the decision of Judge Waddill on the matter of neu-
tral rights and obligations would appear to be considerably in
advance of the accepted principles of international law. He has
been making rather than applying the law of nations. The prin-
ciples he has laid down are excellent in themselves and some of
them will doubtless be incorporated into the body of international
law in the not distant future. But it is scarcely possible for a
neutral court or government to modify the rules of international
law to the disadvantage of one or the other of the parties during
the course of a world-wide war. Inasmuch, therefore, as the
interpretation of the Prussian treaty is in doubt, and the entrance
of prizes into neutral ports is not expressly forbidden by inter-
national law, it would seem to have been the wiser policy for the
court to have released the Appam until such time at least as the
United States government should deny to it the further right
of asylum.30
At the same time, it must be admitted that this government
has gotten itself into an embarrassing situation by allowing its
treaties and neutrality laws to fall so far behind the more en-
lightened practices of other nations. The government at Wash-
ington cannot well assert its full legal rights against all the bel-
ligerents unless it is prepared to live up to the strictest obligations
of neutrality as set forth in the writings of its own international
jurists, the general orders of the Navy Department,37 the resolu-
tions of the Senate and the general precepts of the Court. It
is sincerely to be hoped that the decision of the District Court in
the case of the Appam may awaken Congress to a realization of
the need for a thorough revision of the neutrality laws if the
country is to avoid further complications with foreign states.
The Courts should not be obliged to assume the difficult task of
bringing the neutrality laws of the United States up to date.
C. D. ALLIN.
University of Minnesota.
be rightfully divested." 4 Cranch, 293.
35. Scott, The Case of the Appam. 10 Amer. Jour. Int. Law, 809.
36. 16 Columbia Law Review, Nov. 1916, p. 588.
37. General Order 492 issued by the Navy Department in 1898, states,
Art. 20: Prizes should be sent in for adjudication, unless otherwise
directed, to the nearest home port in which a prize court may be sitting.
